Death tool and manipulation

http://38.201.154.103/articles/?a=1999/4/13/114554
April 14, 1999
The Big Lie About Kosovo
by Richard Poe
“Save the Albanian Kosovars!” Clinton cries. “Save the Sudeten
Germans!” Hitler trumpeted in 1938. The names have changed, but
the strategy remains the same.
For more than 50 years, we Americans have looked down our noses
at the Germans, for having followed Hitler so blindly. But now
it’s our turn. We are proving no more resistant to propaganda
than those cheering crowds in Leni Riefenstahl’s Triumph of the
Will.
Back in the 1930s, Adolf Hitler needed an excuse to seize
Czechoslovakia. So he invented one. Three and a quarter million
ethnic Germans lived in the Sudetenland, under Czech rule. As
William L. Shirer recounts in The Rise and Fall of the Third
Reich, Hitler secretly funded an extremist group called the
Sudeten German Party and ordered it to provoke an uprising
against the Czechs.
Kosovo, too, appears to have been destabilized by outside forces.
For years, Kosovars protested Milosevic peacefully. But in 1997,
a group called the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) suddenly started
shooting. Who were these people?
The Times of London (March 24, 1999) described the KLA as “a
Marxist-led force funded by dubious sources, including drug
money.” European police suspect the KLA of connections to
Albanian gangsters. At least two of the group’s backers appear to
have been the CIA and the German spy agency BND, according to
intelligence analyst John Whitley, quoted in the Truth in Media
Global Watch Bulletin (April 2, 1999).
The purpose of staging a provocation is to create a backlash.
This strategy certainly worked for Hitler in 1938. As unrest
spread in the Sudetenland, the Czechs cracked down. Czech
President Eduard Benes ordered troops into the region and
declared martial law.
Right on cue, the German press went wild. “Women and Children
Mowed Down by Armored Cars,” ran a typical Berlin newspaper
headline in September 1938. “Poison Gas Attack on Aussig” cried
another.
Hitler accused Benes of waging a “war of extermination” against
Sudeten Germans. “The Germans he now drives out!” cried Hitler,
in a September 16, 1938 speech. “We see the appalling figures: on
one day 10,000 fugitives, on the next 20,000… and today
214,000. Whole stretches of country were depopulated, villages
are burned down, attempts are made to smoke out the Germans with
hand-grenades and gas.”
Sound familiar? Hitler’s rhetoric bears an eerie resemblance to
the CNN news blitz on Kosovo. Of course, Hitler was exaggerating.
Many of the atrocities he alleged later turned out to be
fabrications. But the same is true of our newscasts on Kosovo.
Take the alleged massacre of 45 Albanian civilians at Racak, for
instance, reported in January 1999. Forensic and other evidence
now suggests that the bodies were those of KLA guerrillas killed
in combat.
The hoax has been widely discussed in the European press
(including Le Monde, Die Welt, Le Figaro and the BBC). But U.S.
news outlets have been as silent on the controversy as if they
were taking orders from Goebbels himself.
In the Sudeten crisis, Hitler claimed to be inspired by
internationalist ideals. “Among the fourteen points which
President Wilson promised …” the Fuhrer proclaimed, “was the
fundamental principle of the self-determination of all peoples
…” By freeing the Sudeten Germans, Hitler argued, he was
fulfilling Wilson’s vision.
Clinton too claims he is fighting for human rights. But ethnic
cleansing does not bother Clinton when his friends are the ones
doing the cleansing. He ordered no bombing when the Croatians
drove 300,000 Serbs from Krajina, burning their homes and killing
many. Nor did he intervene when our NATO ally Turkey slaughtered
over 35,000 Kurds.
Every schoolchild today knows that Hitler’s real goal, in seizing
Czechoslovakia, was to use it as a stepping stone for his planned
invasion of Russia.
But what is Clinton’s real interest in Kosovo? Nobody knows.
Many theories have been floated. Some point to the Trepca mines
of northern Kosovo, rich in gold, zinc, silver and lead. The New
York Times called them the “Kosovo war’s glittering prize” (July
8, 1998).
Others see a more far-reaching strategy. The Russians claim that
NATO, like Hitler, wants to use the Balkans as a stepping stone
for extending its power eastward — eventually meddling in the
affairs of Russia itself.
But this is all speculation. Only time will reveal Clinton’s true
intentions, as it ultimately did Hitler’s.
In his memoir Inside the Third Reich, Albert Speer recalled the
anxious mood of Berliners, in September 1939, as they digested
the news that England and France had declared war.
“The atmosphere was noticeably depressed,” he recalls. “The
people were full of fear about the future. None of the regiments
marched off to war decorated with flowers as they had done at the
beginning of the First World War. The streets remained empty.
There was no crowd on Wilhelmsplatz shouting for Hitler.”
A wise man once said that those who fail to study history are
condemned to repeat it. Should Clinton actually succeed in
sparking a world war, Americans will no doubt react with the same
shock and fear as Berliners did in 1939. But we will have only
ourselves to blame.
Richard Poe is a freelance journalist and a New York
Times-bestselling author. He writes frequently on historical
themes. Poe’s latest book, “Black Spark, White Fire”, explores
the Afrocentric controversy concerning ancient Egypt.
http://groups.google.com/group/alt.impeach.clinton/browse_thread/thread/ffd7f5a4493a3dbf/a9cd9b43997b20ca?lnk=gst&q=kosovo&rnum=6&hl=en#a9cd9b43997b20ca
NEW YORK TIMES
: August 16, 1998
:
: Serb Troops Step Up Looting and Burning in Kosovo
: By MIKE O’CONNOR
: PRISTINA, Yugoslavia — With the outside world doing little to
: stop them, heavily armed Serbian policemen backed by
: Yugoslav army soldiers are stepping up their terror against
: ethnic Albanian civilians in Kosovo, driving tens of thousands from
: their homes and shelling, looting and burning their villages.
: In at least one village in southern Kosovo, the police are demolishing
: brick homes that survived being set afire. In a village nearby, the
: police told residents that they must surrender any weapons they had
: or their homes would be burned to the ground, according to villagers
: and the local Roman Catholic priest.
: While the government asserts that it destroys homes only if combat
: conditions make this inevitable, foreign diplomats say the Serbs
: obviously hope to clear ethnic Albanian supporters of the armed
: rebels from vast areas of Kosovo.
: Officials of the International Red Cross, which helps oversee the
: Geneva Conventions protecting civilians in war, said Saturday that
: they were debating whether the forces of the Yugoslav president,
: Slobodan Milosevic, were violating the conventions by displacing
: villagers and then destroying their homes.
: Western governments have threatened to use NATO’s might to stop
: what some foreign diplomats here have called a war against civilians.
: NATO says it is weighing its response, and this weekend the German
: defense minister, Volker Ruehe, spoke out strongly in favor of a strike
: against Yugoslav forces even if the Serbs’ traditional Slav Orthodox
: ally, Russia, objects.
: Meanwhile, the government is strengthening its grip on Kosovo, and
: civilian misery abounds.
: Relief agencies estimate that up to 200,000 civilians have fled their
: homes since the government began a military offensive against
: ethnic Albanian rebels on July 19. The rebels had seized control of
: large parts of Kosovo in their bid to make the Serbian-ruled province
: an independent country.
: Many refugees are still living in the open. Foreign relief workers
: report that many of them, especially the elderly and the young, are
: growing increasingly weak and suffering from disease.
: But most reject the government’s urgings to return home, either
: because they fear police or army attacks or because their homes
: have been destroyed.
: Relief agencies say they were overwhelmed by the number of
: refugees and cannot do enough to help them.
: Residents of the village of Novo Selo in southern Kosovo say the
: police have given them until Monday to turn over any weapons or see
: their homes destroyed. The village priest, the Rev. Frane Kola, said
: that he had told the police there were no hidden weapons and had
: invited them to search the homes, but that the police had insisted
: weapons be surrendered.
: “If not, they say they will surround the village and burn the
: buildings,” Kola said.
: Pervua Marku, the village mechanic, said: “They will do it. Look at all
: the other places they are destroying.”
: In the nearby village of Priljep, where residents have fled and where
: officials say the police have been in control for many days, a police
: bunker with a heavy machine gun overlooked the smoldering roofs of
: brick homes. In the streets, policemen with assault rifles were on
: patrol and a bulldozer was leveling what the flames could not destroy.
: With its offensive, the government has regained control of major
: roads and pushed rebel fighters from many areas. The main ethnic
: Albanian political party says 159 villages and hamlets that were
: controlled by the rebels are now back under government authority,
: but most of the residents have fled. Once civilians leave an area, the
: police often loot and then burn homes, farms and businesses.
: By conventional military standards the rebels, who call themselves
: the Kosovo Liberation Army, have been very badly hurt by the
: government attacks. Before the offensive, rebel forces controlled as
: much as 40 percent of the province. Their support had swelled
: dramatically since a fierce police crackdown in March.
: Rebel soldiers serenely patrolled major roads almost in sight of
: government positions and there was a virtual rebel government in
: some regions. Rebel commanders and many ethnic Albanians were
: euphoric, predicting the imminent fall of major cities.
: Now government officials contend that the rebels have been beaten.
: But this is not a conventional war, or even standard guerrilla warfare,
: because the Kosovo Liberation Army is not nearly as much a military
: force as it is a movement. It may not be properly trained, or
: commanded by military professionals, but it may not have to be.
: “This is not a guerrilla war; it is a peasant uprising,” said Shkelzen
: Maliqi, an ethnic Albanian political leader and author. “It is a
: movement which doesn’t have the weapons to fight government
: forces. But this is a secessionist movement which cannot be stopped.”
: By what can be measured on a map alone, the Kosovo Liberation
: Army is reeling, and some commanders admit it. In a remote village
: filled with newly created refugees, where water, medicine and food
: were all scarce, a top commander refused to say how badly his forces
: were hurt.
: “I don’t want to talk about that, because the truth would damage my
: people,” he said, insisting that his name and location not be revealed.
: Government forces were preparing to advance on the village and
: some rebel soldiers in the area seemed in a near panic.
: On the roads traversing areas that rebels had claimed as theirs, the
: government controls all traffic and is running convoys of soldiers.
: A regional commander of the rebels’ special forces, Sabit Geti, was
: tearing along mountain ridges on rutted trails last week, going
: between rebel positions. He reclined in the passenger seat of a car,
: his right leg held straight by a thick, bloody bandage.
: “Yes, they are hurting us,” he said. “They have artillery and tanks, and
: we have only this,” he added, holding up the assault rifle next to him.
: Still, he was able to use back roads to get easily into the northern
: Kosovo city of Mitrovica, obtain medical care and return to the field.
: Foreign military experts say that the government’s offensive has
: stopped the extraordinary rise in the rebels’ military progress but has
: not changed the fundamental equation, which will keep the war going
: unless there is a negotiated peace.
: “There is a single fact that controls this conflict: 90 percent of the
: people here are either supporters or potential supporters of the
: rebels,” said a foreign military expert, referring to Kosovo’s
: overwhelmingly ethnic Albanian population. “No government can
: defeat that, and this government, with its tactics, is only making the
: rebels politically stronger.”
: Along the roads that government forces now hold, soldiers and police
: man a network of bunkers, machine-gun emplacements and
: trenches, many of which are surrounded by growing piles of
: discarded beer bottles and food containers.
: In many places, however, ethnic Albanian forces that have been
: shoved back from the roads and cleared from the now empty villages
: still dominate the rugged rural terrain. There are rebel positions
: within a mile of Priljep, where the police are demolishing homes.
: With the forces facing off in this way, military experts say the next
: move could be conclusive. For now, it appears that neither side has a
: decisive advantage.
: “We did not have a good picture of how organized or cohesive the
: KLA was before the offensive, and it is a lot murkier now,” said a
: European diplomat, referring to the Kosovo Liberation Army. “But they
: look very confused. They may not be able to convert hatred of the
: government into effective military action for a very long time.”
: But Milosevic faces risks, too. While government officials wait to see
: how the rebels react to the offensive, thousands of troops must be
: kept in the field. That costs a lot, and Milosevic’s men are short of
: cash.
: “Now, with these long, exposed, supply lines running everywhere,
: we’ll see how well Belgrade can keep its people in beans and
: bullets,” a foreign diplomat said.
: Another diplomat said: “I believe that simply keeping the troops in the
: field will bankrupt the government quickly. It has only a pittance in
: cash reserves, it can’t pay salaries for teachers and hospital workers
: and it has almost no revenues.”
http://groups.google.com/group/alt.politics.clinton/browse_thread/thread/4194caf920b9273a/7bccddf1edb3f8c0?lnk=gst&q=kosovo&rnum=5&hl=en#7bccddf1edb3f8c0
A year after the air war
A year ago today, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization began an 11-week
bombing campaign against Yugoslavia to “save Kosovo.”
Today, Kosovo is in chaos.
The tensions between ethnic Albanians and Serbs that have frequently led to
bloodshed in the past are higher than ever. There’s no exit strategy in
sight for 37,000 United Nations troops. NATO, so eager to drop bombs last
year, has lost all interest in Kosovo.
Murder, arson and other violent crimes occur on a daily basis with no hope
of accountability. The only police force consists of 2,500 U.N. civilian
officers — many of them retired, working with one hand tied behind their
back and little understanding of local conditions.
If you want a picture of what the nightmare of life under global government
will be like some day, check out Kosovo.
“Split by the River Ibar, endless spirals of razor wire and French Kfor
troops, the divided city of Mitrovica has become a metaphor for the hatred
and latent violence of the province,” reports the London Telegraph.
“Northern Mitrovica, the Serbian enclave protected by the universally
despised French military, is as grim as it gets. People live in overcrowded
apartment blocks disfigured with graffiti — anti-NATO, anti-Albanian,
anti-anything. With virtually no work available, they roam the streets like
zombies or sit in cafes for hours in a drunken stupor.”
The U.N. is hoping that September’s elections will fix things — and make
its dream of a multi-ethnic Kosovo a reality. Many Serbs, however, don’t
want to participate in the vote because they fear it will legitimize the
independence of the province.
So desperate is the West to make this plan work, diplomats have even held
secret talks with Serb President Slobodan Milosevic, whom they have
indicted as a war criminal, to persuade the Mitrovica Serbs to join the
process.
All this would be laughable if it weren’t so tragic — if so many human
lives weren’t at stake, if so many had not already been sacrificed for no
reason.
What do I mean? Let’s recall how this U.S./NATO war on Serbia got started
in the first place. It began with NATO and the Clinton administration lying
about Serbian atrocities in Kosovo. They deliberately and provocatively
whipped up hysteria about violence and genocide that simply did not exist.
Perhaps as few as 2,108 people were actually killed in Kosovo over a period
of months leading up to and including the period of heavy bombardment of
Serbia by NATO forces. While even one death is tragic, some perspective is
needed.
It wasn’t hundreds of thousands of dead in Kosovo, as some reports
suggested. It wasn’t even tens of thousands.
Remember what Clinton told us? He compared the atrocities in Kosovo to the
Holocaust. Kosovo, he said, “is not war in the traditional sense. Imagine
what would happen if we and our allies instead decided just to look the
other way as these people were massacred on NATO’s doorstep.”
While Clinton has blood on his hands for ordering the bombing, he is hardly
alone. Most of the establishment press went along for the ride with all the
pre-war and post-war propaganda from government and supra-government
authorities. Most Republican and Democratic members of Congress
participated in the charade, too.
The biggest lesson, if anyone cares, is that the transfer of power to
unaccountable global authorities is dangerous, illegal, ill-advised and
impractical. Who is going to keep abuses in check? How do people have their
say? What’s to prevent a small elite clique of power brokers from making
war in the future, as they clearly did in Kosovo?
The people of the Balkans are still living with these questions today.
Kosovo may not be in the headlines anymore, but that doesn’t mean all is
well. In fact, usually the worst human rights abuses occur far from the
bright lights of the television cameras. So, most Americans remain
oblivious to the death and destruction their tax dollars wrought on the
people of Serbia. They remain oblivious to the crises we have helped to
create throughout the Balkans. They remain oblivious to the continuing
violence and the hopelessness of imposing long-term solutions on the region
through force.
There is no peace in Kosovo. There is no peace in Bosnia. There is no peace
in Serbia. There is no peace in Montenegro.
Does anybody care?
A daily radio broadcast adaptation of Joseph Farah’s commentaries can be
heard at KTKZ in Sacramento and the Internet portal OnePlace.com
http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/comments/c334.htm
Where are the Bodies in Kosovo (III)? –
Genocide, Accountability, and the Rule of Law
November 24, 1999
Comment: #334

Discussion Thread: #s 326, 327
Please read the error correction statement, Comment # 334A.
References:
[1] MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, “Counting Bodies in Kosovo,” New York Times [Op-Ed], November 21, 1999.
[2] Nick Fraser, “How UN troops gave support to Serb genocide,” Telegraph [UK], November 21, 1999.
[3] Press Release, “UN war crimes prosecutor reports 2,108 bodies exhumed from gravesites in Kosovo,” UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), November 10, 1999.
[4] Steven Erlanger with Christopher S. Wren, “Early Count Hints at Fewer Kosovo Deaths,” New York Times, November 11, 1999.
[5] Kenneth Bacon, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, “Pentagon On Kosovo, Letter to Editor, New York Times, November 17, 1999
BACKGROUND
Where are the bodies in Kosovo?
This question first arose late last summer when reports surfaced suggesting that the number of bodies buried in Kosovo’s killing fields was going to be far lower than NATO’s leaders had led their populations to expect. [see Comment #s 326 & 327]. Normally, such a finding would be greeted with sighs of relief, but in this case the, the prospect of lower numbers is decidedly unwelcome.
A lower body count is unwanted because it puts the credibility of NATO’s leaders into play. They had compared allegations of mass murder in Kosovo to the worst genocides in history. Perhaps this was due to faulty intelligence or perhaps the charge was made to whip up mass support for the war, but whatever the reason, it is clear in retrospect that the charge of genocide made it easier to silence political dissent, bypass legal requirements, and justify the bombing of civilian targets in Serbia.
The lower-than-expected numbers were confirmed on November 10 by the interim forensic results released by Carla Del Ponte, the new chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) [Reference #3 is UN press release]. She revealed that inspections of 37% of suspected sites yielded only 2,108 bodies.
These new numbers, together with the deteriorating situation in Kosovo, are now fueling an overdue debate on the casus belli as well as the conduct and outcome of the Serbo-NATO War. But if the publication of Michael Ignatieff’s Op-Ed in the New York Times (Reference #1) is any indicator, this debate is about to turn ugly.
AIM
Shortly after after Ms. Del Ponte released her numbers, Michael Ignatieff weighed in with a two pronged argument in an Op-Ed published by the New York Times [Reference #1] evidently aimed at achieving two goals: First, to convince readers that genocide occurred or was about to occur in Kosovo, notwithstanding the ICTY’s results, and second, to prove that the real lesson of the Serbo-NATO War is that NATO had a moral obligation to intervene earlier than it did. But to make his case for the higher morality of second goal, he chose not to prove his first goal but to discredit the logic, integrity, and motives of the so-called “revisionists” who have had the temerity to question claims that a genocide was in process.
In so doing, Ignatieff has produced a nasty polemic in which he commits the same sins he accused the sinners of committing. My aim is describe the nature of his attack, because it is likely be only the first round in a dirty war of words, and being forewarned is being forearmed.
REVISIONISM & MORAL MCCARTHYISM
Included in the print version of Inatieff’s text [but not in the electronic version] is the following loaded phase which was printed in larger bold fonts separated by two lines:
“Revisionists distort facts and help Milosevic.”
This characterization is name calling with a sinister touch.
“Revisionist” is a label implying a radical reinterpretation of settled wisdom or history, and its use generally connotes some biased ideological purpose. A deconstruction of the origins of the Cold War in which a left wing historian biases history to assign all the blame for starting the conflict on the West would be a revisionist history. An historical “analysis” that attempts to prove the Holocaust did not occur is revisionism.
In the case of the origins and conduct of the Serbo-NATO War, however, it is preposterous to claim that revisionists are reinterpreting anything.
There is no settled historical wisdom to revise. The history is only five months old and is still changing and mutating daily as new facts emerge. Ignatieff is simply attaching a pejorative label to honest efforts to understand and portray what took place. My guess is that he did this to soften the reader up for a further attack.
That attack comes quickly. By charging the “revisionists” are helping Milosevic, Ignatieff insinuates that these “revisionists” are traitors because they are aiding the enemy. This is the seedy rhetoric of intimidation. It would be more at home in the office of Joseph McCarthy than on the Op-Ed page of a major newspaper.
But the low blow is also revealing: That a writer believes it necessary to resort to this tactic to defend the conduct of the first moral war waged for “humanitarian” reasons, a war that sacrificed the rule of law in the name of a higher morality [see Comment #326], says a lot about the absence of moral clarity that is central to the growing credibility problem now facing the leaders of Western governments.
Equally outrageous are the rhetorical twists and analytical turns Ignatieff used to make his argumentum intimidatum. Two examples will suffice to illustrate his loose construction standards:
I. INGANTIEFF’S WEIRD ARITHMETIC OF DEATH
Mr. Ignatieff accuses the “revisionists” of distorting facts, but he distorts facts to prove his point. This can be seen clearly by analyzing the following passage which is extracted verbatim and printed exactly as in the printed version, except for the emphasis of CAPITAL LETTERS, which are his words but my emphasis:
——–[Begin Passage 1]—–
Ingnatieff said,
“Moreover, the revisionists have misinterpreted the Hague tribunal’s numbers. The tribunal’s total figure — 2,108 bodies uncovered from 195 sites — appeared at first to confirm the revisionists’ claims. But the revisionists FAILED TO NOTICE that there are at least 334 other sites that the investiga-
——[Subtitle Phrase in larger bold font in Print Version at this point]———
Revisionists distort facts and help Milosevic
——[end subtitle phrase]———
-tors will turn to in the spring when the ground thaws and digging can resume. No one knows how many bodies will be uncovered from these remaining sites or whether more sites will be discovered.
The TRIBUNAL’S CURRENT ESTIMATE — from Western intelligence sources, eyewitness statements and evidence taken from surviving family members — is that there are 11,334 bodies at 529 sites. Instead of exaggerating the case, the British Foreign Ministry’s estimate in June of 10,000 bodies appears, if anything, to UNDERSTATE it.”
—–[End Passage 1]——
The assertion that the so-called revisionist literature failed to notice that 334 sites were not yet excavated is an outrageous fiction.
In fact, the overwhelming majority of the news reports and Op-Eds I have read have gone out of their way to emphasize this point. There are too many of these reports to distribute with this message, but I will distribute them in my next message so you can satisfy yourself as to the truth of my statement.
But a false premise is only the beginning of Ignatieff’s distortion. Note how he used the unexamined graves to argue that 10,000 bodies represents a probable UNDERSTATEMENT of the ultimate total.
His numbers are correct, at least in the sense that they are the same numbers released by Ms. Del Ponte. But his arithmetic is strange, and his argument is irrational and anti-empirical. To make matters worse, he twists wording and leaves out other information that was reported in the ICTY press release and the New York Times (of all places!).
To see why, let us compare what he said to Ms. Del Ponte’s words, the logical implications of her numbers, and the other supporting information.
On November 10, Del Ponte told the UN Security Council that forensic investigators from 14 countries had exhumed 2,108 bodies from 195 (or 37%) of the 529 suspected grave sites in Kosovo, before the onset of winter shut down operations [Reference #3 is the official UN press release obtained form the UN web site].
Ms Del Ponte also said there was evidence of tampering and concealment, including burning, so the precise number of bodies could not be counted. The current estimate, which is now the best information available, is therefore an interim number.
Ignatieff’s predilection for subtly twisting words to suit his needs is immediately apparent when one compares his words in Passage #1 to those in Del Ponte’s the Press Release [Reference #3]. First, note how Press Release says that the ICTY “has received reports of 11,334 bodies in the 529 grave sites” but Ignatieff the 11,234 bodies are the “tribunal’s current estimate.” The phrase “current estimate” conveys a greater sense of certainty and analysis than is suggested by the phrase “received reports.”
Why make such a slight change? To soften up the reader for the assertion that 10,000 is a PROBABLE understatement of the total body count.
But a little arithmetic shows why this assertion is both illogical and anti-empirical. This can be seen when we compare the ICTY numbers to his claim.
Based on the grisly statistics in the Press Release, Ms. Del Ponte’s numbers indicate an average yield of 10.8 bodies per mass killing site. To reach Ignatieff’s “understated” total of 10,000 bodies would require the unexamined 334 sites to yield an additional 7,892 bodies, or 23.6 bodies per site, or 2.2 times as many bodies per site as those investigated to date.
In other words, Ignatieff’s argument depends on a weird hidden assumption: namely, that investigators were guided by some sort of priority system that caused them to systematically examine the sites LEAST LIKELY to prove the allegation they set out to prove!
On the other hand, if investigators had examined a random sample of “average” sites, a yield of 10.8 bodies per site would result in 5,713 bodies for all 529 sites, or only 57% of the 10,000 bodies Ignatieff claims is an understatement of the death toll.
But it is highly unlikely serious forensic investigators, operating under the intense pressure of time in the spotlight of worldwide scrutiny, would choose to examine the “least lucrative” or “average” sites first. It is more logical to assume they were working hard to prove their case.
In fact, just 10 days before Ignatieff’s Op-Ed, Steven Erlanger and Christopher Wren of the same New York Times confirmed what is logical when they reported that unnamed sources told them that investigators examined the most serious sites first [Reference #4].
Furthermore, these officials suggested other factors might tend to reduce the results further. They cautioned, for example, that not all the bodies recovered were the result of atrocities; some may have been combatants in the Kosovo Liberation Army and others may have died naturally. Other reports indicate that some of the bodies may be the remains of Serbian Kosovars.
Given these uncertainties, which Ignatieff ignores, a policy of ‘examining the most serious sites first’ would therefore seem to suggest the probable yield of the remaining 334 sites will be less per site than the 195 sites examined to date, implying a non-trivial probability that the final number could be significantly less than 5,700.
On there other hand, there is at least one offsetting uncertainty that could push the numbers higher. The evidence of tampering suggests the Serbs may have hidden some of the bodies. One might be tempted to argue, therefore, that the absence of human remains does not constitute evidence against the charge of genocide. According to this line of reasoning, the Serbs learned how to hide the results of their grisly business from their experience in Bosnia, and therefore it will take years, if ever, to prove that a genocide occurred or was in the process of occurring in Kosovo.
But to make an argument stick when it is based on the assumption that evidence to the contrary does not disprove the hypothesis, the advocate must carefully explain why this conclusion is logical and provide sufficient inferential evidence to support that logic.
In this case, it is clear that the Serbs would have to hidden a very large number of bodies to make up for the differences between the claims and the results implied by the exhumations to date. While this is not impossible, disposing of such a large number of bodies with no trace is no easy task in the best of circumstances … and the Serbs were not operating in the best of circumstances, given that (1) they had only 40,000-50,000 Serb military and para-military troops and 78 days to do their dirty work while, at the same time, they were (2) busy driving 860,000 Albanians out of Kosovo, (3) fighting an escalating guerrilla war against and increasingly well-armed and organized KLA inside Kosovo, (4) digging in, laying minefields, and preparing fortifications to defend against a NATO ground invasion, and all the while (5) hiding from the constant surveillance and bombardment being dished out by NATO’s airplanes.
It is clearly incumbent for adherents of the anti-empirical inferential counter-argument to explain how the Serbs could kill all these people and hide their remains in these circumstances. Mr. Ignatieff didn’t touch this tar baby.
So, what can we conclude from the ICTY’s body count?
Based on the best information assembled to date, it seems reasonable to conclude that cumulative effects of priorities and uncertainties suggest 5,700 bodies is probably close to being an upper bound of the final total.
The true death toll may indeed turn out be much HIGHER than 5,700, but absent additional information, Ignatieff’s claim that 10,000 killed is a conservative UNDERSTATEMENT is clearly an unsubstantiated speculation based on an irrational and biased construction that was shaped more his desire to ‘prove’ the answer he wanted to prove than by a desire to get at the truth, whatever that may turn out to be.
II. A SLY RENDERING
There is a second example of Ignatieff’s sloppy argumentative standards.
A following passage reveals again how Ignatieff makes the same mistake he accuses the so-called revisionists of making. This one deals with his slick rendering of the Secretary of Defense’s comments to CBS’s “Face the Nation” on May 16.
—–[Begin Passage 2]—–
Ingnatieff said,
“Actually, the revisionists may have been the ones to get their facts wrong.
In Mr. Cohen’s appearance on “Face the Nation,” his statements were actually much more complicated. While he said that 100,000 were missing, he also CLEARLY stated that his reports showed that 4,600 Kosovars had been executed, a claim that has been confirmed by the FORENSIC TRAIL OF EVIDENCE uncovered by war crimes investigators since June.”
——–[End Passage 2]——
Note first how Ignatieff casually inserts the claim that 4,600 executions have been confirmed by forensic evidence, but we just saw that Ms. Del Ponte said the ITCY forensic teams recovered only 2,108 bodies. What other forensic evidence is he referring to? He doesn’t tell us.
Rhetorical tricks aside, the real question is what did Mr. Cohen say and, more importantly, what did he mean to say?
It turns out that only four days before Ignatieff’s Op-Ed, on November 17, the same New York Times published the Pentagon’s official explanation of what Mr. Cohen meant to say on “Face the Nation.” It took the form of a letter to the editor from Kenneth Bacon, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs [see Reference #5].
Bacon said, “In an appearance on the CBS News program “Face the Nation” on May 16, Mr. Cohen mentioned reports that 100,000 military-age men were missing. When asked if they might have been killed, Mr. Cohen did not discount the possibility, but he also cited reports that a lower number — as many as 4,600 — had been killed. … While conceding that the number might be “far higher,” Mr. Cohen did not mean to suggest that it was as high as 100,000.”
Now if we compare Bacon’s letter to Ignatieff’s claim in Passage #2, only one thing is clear: Bacon is NOT saying that “Cohen clearly stated that his reports had showed 4,600 hundred Kosovars had been executed.”
If Cohen had said this clearly, Bacon would not have found it necessary to issue a clarifying statement. Ignatieff’s slippery insertion of “clarity” is obviously biased to make his point, but Bacon’s apologia for Cohen’s studied ambiguity makes it clear that Ignatieff’s statement misrepresents the tenor and context of what was really said. If we are to take Mr. Bacon at his word, Cohen’s claim evidently was a carefully nuanced statement made by a highly intelligent, skilled politician for the likely purpose of suggesting that far more than 4,600 may have been killed, while at the same time leaving himself a linguistic maneuvering room to escape from the implications of his words, should it be necessary to do so at a later date.
THE SLIPPERY LOGIC OF MORAL CLAIMS
The justification for using American forces in Kosovo has been and continues to be a moral argument that intervention was necessary because a genocide was in progress. The record makes it clear that this rationale was used repeatedly in March and April to justify the reactive escalating bombing campaign that became necessary when Slobo did not cave in after a few days of cosmetic bombing, as predicted [see Comment 318].
On March 28, for example, the Associated Press reported that NATO was ordering up more firepower in a race against time to smash Serb military units and head off what it called ”genocide” against Kosovo. German Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping emphasized this point, saying ”Genocide is starting,” in a television interview with station ZDF. British Defense Secretary George Robertson made the same point in a separate interview, saying ”We are confronting a regime that is intent on genocide,”
On April 15, the American Secretary of State Madeline Albright testified to the House Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee, saying that “President Milosevic has unleashed a rampage of ethnic cleansing and genocide directed at the expulsion or total submission of the Kosovo Albanian community.”
On April 24, in a New York Times Op-Ed, Tony Blair wrote that “Only NATO has the ability to oppose the Serb campaign of ethnic cleansing – a sustained campaign of brutality that has turned Kosovo into a slaughterhouse, with Mr. Milosevic’s death squads burning, raping, and killing.
A search of the internet (key words: Clinton, genocide, Kosovo) shows that President Clinton was more circumspect in his parsing of words, but he nevertheless liberally laced his speeches and statements with allusions to genocides elsewhere, creating the impression of linking without directly accusing the Milosevic regime of the crime.
A quick survey of the internet also suggests that the charge of genocide in Kosovo was usually raised in a context that includes one or more of the following: the brutally efficient mass expulsions and murderous atrocities of April and May, the demonization of Milosevic and his cronies or the Serbs in general, NATO’s decision in late April to begin bombing civilian targets in Yugoslavia, or NATO’s post-war policy of maintaining harsh economic sanctions against the Yugoslavian people until they get rid of Slobodan Milosevic.
Bear in mind, all these charges and claims took place against a background of questionable legality (1) The Constitution was bypassed and the War Powers Act neutralized. (2) The defensive nature of the NATO treaty was arbitrarily changed, without the advice and consent of Senate or national debate, by an offensive attack on a sovereign nation that did not pose a threat to any members of NATO. (3) UN resolutions that did not authorize the use of military force (UNSCRs 1199 & 1203) were used to justify bombing . (4) Bombing attacks aimed at changing one man’s mind by deterring or weakening his military instruments of oppression IN Kosovo degenerated into attacks on an entire Serbian nation, with civilian targets, like shoe factories and general power supplies, being bombed in possible violation of the Geneva Convention.
Given this background of a questionable legal justification and a wild escalation that went far beyond the pre-war intentions of NATO’s planners, it is easy to see why apologists for the conduct of this war are struggling to justify what happened by charging their adversary with the patently evil crime of genocide.
Atrocities certainly occurred and continue to occur in Kosovo – first by Serbs and now by Albanians. But Ms. Del Ponte’s evidence suggests the total dead may be less than the 7,414 Muslim men and boys slaughtered in Srebrenica by the Bosnian Serbs in six days between July 11 and July 17, 1995 [see Reference #2]. That massacre did not result in formal charges of genocide against the alleged perpetrators the crimes. It did result in charges of war crimes. Like Srebrenica, there are grounds for charging some Serbs, including Milosevic, with war crimes and/or crimes against humanity in Kosovo. There are also grounds for making similar charges against those Kosovar Albanians who are now systematically murdering old women and cleansing Serbs and other minorities out of Kosovo.
Bear also in mind that a total body count of 5,700 Albanian Kosovars would represent three-tenths of one percent of the pre-war population of 2,000,000. People who question whether such a small numbers would amount to a genocide (a charge, by the way, that Milosevic was not even accused of in the May indictment) are not engaging in revisionism. Nor are they helping the enemy, as Ignatieff’s weird logic and sloppy analytical standards would have the reader believe.
I want to conclude this section with a brief discussion Mr. Ignatieff’s concluding remarks in Passage #3 below.
—–[Begin Passage #3]—-
“The revisionist case could be turned on its head. They imply that we should have waited until the oppression turned into mass murder. But the point of interventions is surely to stop that deadly downward spiral before it begins.
The true lesson of Kosovo might be that we should have intervened in the summer of 1998 — when the Serb offensive was beginning. We should have deployed troops on the Albanian and Macedonian borders and conducted an air campaign sufficiently robust to convince Mr. Milosevic that we knew where the line was between oppression and massacre, even if he did not. Had we done so, had we matched means and ends more adequately, we might not be arguing about body counts at all.”
——[End Passage #3]——
Motherhood, with the benefit of hindsight, is easy. But before you buy into vague statements about “what might have been,” consider the implications of making a decision in the Summer of 1998 to base large numbers of troops in Albania and Macedonia and to conduct a robust bombing campaign in 1998. It is true that fighting in Kosovo escalated sharply in February 1998 (but the KLA kicked it off, although the Serbs were also intent on resuming the fighting). By June, a crisis was building and at least 65,000 Kosovar Albanians had fled from their homes for safety in the hills (incidentally, fleeing to hills for safety seems to have been a recurring pattern in Kosovo since at least 1688 – see Noel Malcom, “Kosovo: A Short History,” p. 142.)
On the other hand, when considering what should have be done, think about what Ignatieff did not say.
He did not say that the United States and Britain in fact tried to obtain approval of a U.N. Security Council resolution authorizing NATO to use force against Serbia in the Summer of 1998. He did not say that Russia strenuously opposed military action. He did not say the threat of a Russian veto is why the language of UNSCR 1199 specifically excluded a reference to the use of force. When faced with the certainty of a Russian veto, Ignatieff did not say that U.S. officials took the position that such a resolution, while preferable, was not a necessary authority for NATO action – a position which was reflected in the bombing threats in the Fall.
Moreover, he did not say that NATO, in fact, began planning a bombing campaign – a process suggesting the obvious – namely, that it takes time to put together a robust bombing campaign. In fact, by the opening night of the Serbo-NATO War, on March 24, 1999, planners at NATO Headquarters had produced 40 versions of the coming air war [Wash Post, Sept 21, 1999].
Nor did he explore the moral implications of a bombing campaign in 1998 that would have taken place against the express wishes of the United Nations.
As for basing large numbers of combat-ready troops in Albania and Macedonia, Mr. Ignatieff did not say how NATO could have assembled sufficient forces in time to support a robust bombing campaign in the Summer of 1998, particularly in view of Greece’s resistance to NATO’s use of port of Thessalonika and Albania’s primitive transportation infrastructure which required major construction to support large scale troop movements. Apparently, he forgot the slow pace of deployment in widely reported Task Force Hawk fiasco last April.
The simple fact is that Ignatieff’s conclusion of “what might have beens” added nothing to his argument because the political, legal, and logistical lead times made it impractical to intervene in the Summer of 1998. The real point of his essay is to torch the so-called “revisionists” with a firestorm of distortions and irrational musings.
There is one “what might have been” that Ignatieff did not address which bears mentioning, however. Perhaps the war could have been avoided.
According to a report by Olivia Ward of the Toronto Star, the Serbian Parliament passed a second resolution on March 23, immediately after rejecting the Rambouillet “Accord.” [comment #318 discussed the intolerable and provocative conditions of Annex B]. Ms. Ward said the second resolution hinted that Serbia might be willing to accept U.N. troops in Kosovo because it expressed a willingness to review the “range and character of an international presence” in Kosovo after a political agreement on the province was signed [see Toronto Star, March 24]. Perhaps the Serbian overture was a propaganda sham, but we ought to ask if it would have been wiser, more law abiding, and less bloody to have to have taken a little time to explore the implications of the second resolution before than using Serbia’s the rejection of Rambouillet as a trigger to start bombing on March 24.
There may also be an important lesson to be learned from the events set into motion in the Summer of 1998. Consider the following scenario: The attitude that NATO could bomb Kosovo without UN authorization was born that summer, when American and British diplomats realized that Russia would veto any UN resolution that contained language authorizing the bombing. The hardening of that attitude was reinforced by the decision to authorize NATO Headquarters to begin planning of a bombing campaign. It was reinforced further by the bombing threats made in October. The hardening attitude is also evident in the unacceptable demands in Annex B of the Rambouillet “Accord” as well as in the intelligence appreciations that Milosevic would back down after a few days of cosmetic bombing [Comment #318].
One could speculate, therefore, that one lesson of this war was that operant conditioning took place over the time period between June 1998 and March 1999. This conditioning created a political blind spot that made it psychologically difficult, if not impossible, for decision makers to back away from bombing Serbia after it rejected Rambouillet, notwithstanding a possible Serbian overture toward a compromise. Then, the plan backfired when Slobo did not cave in to pressure of bombing as predicted, but chose instead to launch a massive ethnic cleansing counter offensive. Slobo’s early successes put the very existence of NATO at risk and backed NATO into a corner [see Comment #s 252 & 269]. NATO, an alliance of 780 million, on the verge of its 50th anniversary, could not afford to be humiliated by losing a war to Serbia, an impoverished country of only 10 million people with an economy only two-thirds the size of that in Fairfax County, Virginia. So, NATO had to escalate, but it needed an excuse to justify a brutal bombing campaign against civilian targets in Serbia that went far beyond what pre-war planners anticipated and what politicians had prepared their populations to accept. The massive expulsions, the obvious brutality, a large number of murderous atrocities, and the horrendous conditions of the refugee camps destabilizing Macedonia and Albania, together with the CNN effect, handed NATO a propaganda club to was too good not to use, and so exaggerated claims taking the form of the of genocide were a natural evolution for decision makers trying to dig themselves out of a hole.
Hypothetical … To be sure. Ridiculous … perhaps, but no more so than Ignatieff’s lessons of 1998.
CONCLUSION
The hypothetical scenario described above is intended to show why a serious effort to answer question of genocide is central to understanding and making a judgment about the origins as well as the conduct and outcome of the Serbo-NATO War.
A decision to go to war is the most serious decision any nation’s government can make, and accountability for that a decision must be the top priority for a representative democracy. The citizens of a representative democracy have a right, indeed a moral obligation, to demand a full accounting after the fact; otherwise the concept of representative government becomes a sham and the moral ideal of the rule of law based on a Constitution becomes a farce, a tragedy, or both, to paraphrase Mr. Madison.
Mr. Ignatieff demonstrated that he is highly skilled at entertaining unsubstantiated possibilities. He would be well advised to apply that same skill to his assessment of the motives of those he disagrees with. Included among these possibilities would be the idea that at least some of these “revisionists” are decent citizens and patriots who concerned about accountability, the Constitution, the rule of law, the UN Charter, and the Geneva Conventions.
My next message will provide a list of “revisionist” literature so interested readers can draw their own conclusion about why these people are saying what they are saying.
Chuck Spinney
[Disclaimer: In accordance with 17 U.S.C. 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only.]
[ Reference #3]——————
UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)
Press Release
UN war crimes prosecutor reports 2,108 bodies exhumed from gravesites in Kosovo.
NOVEMBER 10 — Investigators have exhumed 2,108 bodies from gravesites in Kosovo, the newly appointed Prosecutor for the UN Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, Ms. Carla Del Ponte said today in New York.
She told the UN Security Council that this figure did not necessarily reflect the total number of actual victims from the sites so far investigated because there was evidence of tampering with graves. There were also a significant number of sites where the precise number of bodies could not be counted.
In the sites that were examined, “steps were taken to hide the evidence” and “many bodies have been burned”, Ms. Del Ponte said.
After five months of investigation by forensic specialists from 14 countries, the Tribunal has received reports of 11,334 bodies in 529 gravesites, including sites where bodies were found exposed. Approximately 195 of those sites have been examined to date.
Ms. Del Ponte also stressed the importance of the Council’s support for the Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda “The effectiveness and strength of international criminal justice ultimately lies in your hands,” she told the Council. “I therefore urge the Council to put its full weight behind our efforts when we ask for your assistance, and to be creative in finding ways to bring to bear the sort of pressure that will produce results.”
Citing Yugoslavia’s “total defiance” in surrendering indicted accused persons, Ms. Del Ponte said she feared Serbia was becoming a safe haven for indicted war criminals who have been accused of serious crimes in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo. “This situation cannot be allowed to continue,” she said.
[Reference #5]—–
New York Times
November 17, 1999
Letter to Editor
Pentagon On Kosovo
To the Editor: Articles about international efforts to determine the death toll in Kosovo frequently report that Defense Secretary William S. Cohen said that as many as 100,000 Kosovar Albanian men might have been killed (”Early Count Hints at Fewer Kosovo Deaths,” news article, Nov. 11).
In an appearance on the CBS News program “Face the Nation” on May 16, Mr. Cohen mentioned reports that 100,000 military-age men were missing. When asked if they might have been killed, Mr. Cohen did not discount the possibility, but he also cited reports that a lower number — as many as 4,600 — had been killed.
While conceding that the number might be “far higher,” Mr. Cohen did not mean to suggest that it was as high as 100,000.
Kenneth H. Bacon, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Washington, Nov. 15, 1999
The Balkans
http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/comments/c255.htm

http://www.antiwar.com/bock/b120299.html
http://emperors-clothes.com/s-c/s-zasto.htm

It is unlikely that German commanders will ever face these occupation problems in the Balkans again. However, a review of the mistakes these commanders made would undoubtedly cause them to urge any future occupier to begin his administration with a clear-cut statement of policy, including a promise of eventual withdrawal of occupation troops and self-determination for the people; a unified military command and distinct delineation of responsibility in the political and military fields; the assignment of trained, well-equipped combat troops in adequate numbers to the area; the taking of prompt and effective though not excessively harsh measures to quell disorders; and an extensive propaganda campaign to explain the purpose of the occupation and the benefits to accrue to the population with the maintenance of law and order. Finally, they would most certainly recommend the troops be supplied from outside the country and restrained from excesses. With perseverance, the occupation forces might then be able to avoid the Balkan chaos of 1941-44.
THE FIRST CASUALTY
In war, goes the old saw, the first casualty is truth. That was certainly the case in the Kosovo war/bombardment/whatever, but it is important to remind ourselves and others of the fact.

http://www.counterpunch.org/bodycount.html
During the first month of the war on Yugoslavia, the NATO planes and cruise missile made over 10,000 attacks. More than 2500 cruise missiles were launched and over 7,000
tons of explosives were dropped. The following list is based on information provided by the Yugoslavian Foreign Ministry.
About 1,000 civilians, including 45 children (Click here for photos of children injured in NATO attack on a tourist bus near Pristina, Kosovo), were killed and more than
4,500 sustained serious injuries e.g.:
- in Kursumlija: 13 dead and 25 wounded;
- in Panevo: 2 dead and 4 wounded;
- in Kragujevac: over 120 workers were wounded during an attack on the car
factory “Zastava”;
- in Vranje: two dead and 23 wounded;
- in Aleksinac: 12 dead and more than 40 wounded;
- in Nagavac village, Orahovac municipality: 11 dead and 5 wounded;
- in Pristina: 10 dead and 8 wounded;
- Grdelicka gorge: 55 killed and 16 wounded;
- attack on two refugee columns, with four cruise missiles, on the
Djakovica-Prizren road: 75 killed and 100 wounded, of whom 26 critically;
- in the village of Srbica: 10 killed, among whom 7 children;
- Belgrade suburb of Batajnica: a three year old girl Milica Rakic was
killed, and five civilians wounded.
- in Nis: in the attack on housing flats one civilian was killed while 11
wounded;
- in Pristina: in the attack on a Provisional Executive Council building
in the suburb Grmija, one civilian was killed while 2 wounded;
- in Djakovica: in the attack on a refugee settlement housing Serb
refugees from the Republika Srpska Krajina (Croatia), 10 refugees were
killed and 16 wounded;
- in Belgrade: in the attack on the Radio Television of Serbia office
building, 15 employees have been killed and 17 wounded;

After the demolition of the Petrovaradin bridge, Novi Sad and Petrovaradin
were cut of water supply (600 000 citizens) since the main and city
pipeline was constructed into the bridge. About one million citizens, according to Yugoslav sources, are short of water. About 500 000 workers became jobless due to the total destruction of industrial facilities all around the country. Two million citizens have no means for living and cannot ensure the minimum for existence.
Overall material damage is enormous. Preliminary estimates indicate that NATO
air strikes have incurred damages in excess of 10 billion dollars. In the
territory of the northern province of Vojvodina alone, damages have been
estimated in excess of 3,5 billion dollars.
T R A F F I C
The road and railway networks, especially road and rail bridges, most of
which were destroyed or damaged beyond repair, suffered extensive
destruction. The targets of attacks were such communications as:
1. BRIDGES (18 DESTROYED AND 12 DAMAGED):
(a) Destoyed (20)
1. The Varadin Bridge over the Danube (on 1 April 1999);
2. The “Sloboda” (Freedom) Bridge over the Danube (on 4 April 1999);
3. The “Zezeljov” Bridge in Novi Sad (on 5 April 1999);
4. The bridge over the Ibar river, Biljanovac municipality (on 5 - 13
April 1999);
5. The bridge over the Vrba.ka river near Jezgrovic (on 5 April 1999);
6. The “Lozno” railway bridge near Usfe (on 5 April 1999);
7. The road bridge on the road leading to Brvenik, near Usce (on 5 April
1999);
8. The bridge near Zubin Potok, on the Kosovska Mitrovica - Ribarice road
(on 5 April 1999);
9. The old bridge on the river Rasina near the town of Krusevac (12-13
April 1999);
10. The new bridge on the river Rasina near the town of Krusevac (12-13
April 1999);
11. The Krusevac-Pojate bridge on the river Zapadna Morava, at the village
of Jasika (on 13 April 1999);
12. The railway bridge on the river Lim, between Priboj and Prijepolje,
near hydroelectric power station Bistrica (on 15 April 1999);
13. The bridge on the river Ibar, at the village of Brvenik, linking
Korlace and Raska (15.04.1999.);
14. The bridge between Smederevo and Kovin (16 April 1999);
15. The railway bridge on the river Kostajnica, near Kursumlija
(18.04.1999.);
16. The bridge over the regional Kursumlija - Prokuplje road;
17. The bridge over the river Vrapcevska Reka near the village of
Ribarice, from the direction of Kosovska Mitrovica;
18. The bridge over the railway track on the regional road Biljanovac -
Mt. Kopaonik;
19. The railway bridge near the village of Rudnica in the vicinity of
Raska, on the Kraljevo - Kosovo Polje railway line;
20. The bridge over the Danube along the Beograd-Novi Sad road, near
Beska, Indjija municipality (on 21 April 1999);
(b) Damaged (12)
1. The “Mladosti” (Youth) Bridge over the Danube, connecting Backa Palanka
with Ilok, was damaged (on 4 April 1999);
2. The new railway/road bridge over the Danube connecting Bogojevo and
Erdut was damaged (on 5 April 1999);
3. The road bridge along the Magura Belafevac road, 15 kilometres from
Pristina, suffered extensive damage;
4. The bridge along the Nis-Pristina primary road, near Kursumlija, was
extensivelly damageg (on 5 April 1999);
5. The Grdelica gorge railway bridge, on the river Juzna Morava, was
damaged (on 12 April 1999);
6. The Grdelica gorge road bridge, on the river Juzna Morava, was damaged
(on 12 April 1999);
7. The road bridge over the Kosanica river near Kursumlija was damaged (on
13 April 1999);
8. The road bridge on the river Toplica, on the Nis-Pristina road near the
town of Kursumlija, was heavily damaged (14 and 19 April 1999);
9. The bridge on the river Kosanica, at the village of Selo Visoko, has
sustained heavy damages and is out of service 18.04.1999.);
10. The road bridge “Raskrsnica” near Donja Bistrica, on the route Priboj -
Prijepolje - Nova Varos, has sustained heavy damages (20 April 1999);
11. The railway bridge on the river Sava near Ostruznica, has been heavily
damaged (21, 23 April 1999);
12. The railway bridge on the Kraljevo - Raska railway line, near
Kraljevo, has been heavily damaged (23 April 1999);
2. RAILWAYS RAILWAY STATIONS (16):
1. The Kraljevo - Kosovo Polje rail, near Ibarska Slatina;
2. The Belgrade - Bar rail, due to the destruction of the railway track
near the village of Strbce and destruction of the bridge on the river Lim,
between Priboj and Prijepolje;
3. The Kursumlija - Prokuplje rail, near Pepeljevac village;
4. The Kraljevo - Kosovo Polje rail, near Ibarska Slatina;
5. The Nis - Pristina rail, near Kursumlija;
6. “Sarpelj” tunnel, near Jerinje village, 15 km north of Leposavic
towards Raska, was destroyed;
7. Railway station in Kraljevo (Bogutovac);
8. Railway station in Kosovo Polje;
9. The Belgrade - Thessaloniki rail, due to the destruction of the bridge
in the Grdelica gorge;
10. Railway station in the town of Biljanovac;
11. Railway track and overpass (Josinacka Banja) near the town of
Biljanovac;
12. Railway track Kursumlija - Podujevo, due to damages on the railway
bridge at Kursumlija; 13. Railway track Kraljevo - Kragujevac, due to
damages to the section of the track near the village of Vitanovac;
14. Railway track Uzice - Priboj:
15. Railway track Bogojevo - Vukovar;
16. Railway Track Leskovac - Predejane;
3. ROADS AND TRANSPORTERS (6 MAJOR ROADS):
1. Ibarska primary road, due to damages to the bridge on the Ibar river,
Biljanovac municipality, and destruction of the road between Pozega and
Cacak;
2. Belgrade-Zagreb highway, near Stari Banovci;
3. Traffic suspended on the Kosovska Mitrovica-Ribarici section of the
Adriatic highway due to the destruction of the bridge over the Vrbacka
river;
4. “Jedinstvo” bus station in Vranje sustained extensive damage;
5. “Kosmet Prevoz” transporter in Gnjilane (a hangar full of new buses);
6. Kraljevo-Raska primary road;
7. Bus station in Pristina;
8. Traffic has been suspended on the Krusevac-Pojate road due to the
destruction of the bridge on the Zapadna Morava, in the village of Jasika;
9. Traffic has been suspended on the Nis-Pristina road, due to the fact
that the bridge on the river Toplica, near the town of Kursumlija, has
sustained heavy damage;
10. Traffic has been suspedned on the regional road Priboj - Prijepolje -
Nova Varos, due to damages inflicted on the bridge “Raskrsnica” near Donja
Bistrica;
11. Road maintenance company “Magistrala” in Pristina;
12. The Nis Central Bus Station;
13. The Pristina Bus Station;
4. AIRPORTS (7):
- “Slatina” in Pristina; “Batajnica” and “Surcin” in Belgrade; Nis
airport; “Ponikve” in Uzice; “Golubovac” in Podgorica, “Ladjevci” airport
near Kraljevo; agricultural and sports airfield in Sombor.
ECONOMIC AND CIVILIAN TARGETS, PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS
The air strikes have so far destroyed or damaged several thousand economic facilities and dwellings. In the Leskovac region alone, over 3,500 industrial facilities and
dwellings were either destroyed or damaged. The devastation is particularly bad in Pristina, Novi Sad, Aleksinac, Djakovica, Prokuplje, Gracanica, Cuprija, etc. Housing
blocks on the outskirts of Belgrade - Kijevo Knezevac, Batajnica, Jakovo, Borca, as well as the area around Pancevo have been under attack.
1. INDUSTRY AND TRADE:
The NATO attacks have targeted the factories and industrial
facilities which directly cater for the needs of the population, among
which are:
1. “Galenika” drug factory in Belgrade;
2. Industrial complex “Dvadeset Prvi Maj” in Rakovica;
3. Machine building plant “Industrija Motora Rakovica” in Rakovica;
4. Factory “Jugostroj” in Rakovica;
5. Factory “Frigostroj” in Rakovica;
6. “Lola Utva” agricultural aircraft factory in Pancevo;
7. “Zdravlje” pharmaceutical plant in Leskovac;
8. “Sloboda” white goods factory in Cacak;
9. “Din” tobacco industry in Nis;
10. “Elektronska industrija” factory in Nis;
11. “Jastrebac” machine industry in Nis;
12. Facilities of the “Beograd” rail company in Nis;
13. Construction material depot “Ogrev Invest” in Nis;
14. General merchandise depot “Kopaonik” in Nis;
15. Production line of the tobacco factory “Nis” in Nis;
16. “Elektrotehna” warehouse in Nis;
17. Food storage facility “Fidelinka” in Nis;
18. Facilities of the machine industry in Nis;
19. Office building of the company “So Produkt” in Nis;
20. Facilities of the pharmaceutical company “Velafarm” in Nis;
21. “Zastava” car factory in Kragujevac;
22. “14 Oktobar” machine factory in Krusevac;
23. Production line of the metal factory “Metalac” in Kursumlija;
24. “Krusik” holding corporation in Valjevo;
25. “Ciklonizacija” in Novi Sad;
26. “Tehnogas” in Novi Sad;
27. “Novograp” in Novi Sad;
28. “Gumins” in Novi Sad;
29. “Albus” in Novi Sad;
30. “Petar Drapsin” in Novi Sad;
31. “Motins” in Novi Sad;
32. “Izolacija” in Novi Sad;
33. “Novokabel” in Novi Sad;
34. “Istra” fittings factory in Kula;
35. The port of Bogojevo;
36. “Div” cigarette factory in Vranje;
37. “Nova Jugoslavija” printers in Vranje;
38. Furniture factor “Simpo” in Vranje;
39. Textile industry “Jumko” in Vranje;
40. Wood-processing complex “27. November” in Raska;
41. Tubes factory in Urosevac;
42. “Milan Blagojevic” chemical plant in Lucani;
43. Plastics factory in Pristina;
44. Cotton yarn factory in Pristina;
45. Shock-absorber factory in Pristina;
46. Surface coal mine “Belacevac”;
47. “Binacka Morava” hydro construction company in Gnjilane;
48. Cigarette factory in Gnjilane;
49. Battery factory in Gnjilane:
50. Over 250 commercial and crafts shops in Djakovica were destroyed;
51. “Dijana” shoe factory in Sremska Mitrovica;
2. REFINERIES AND WAREHOUSES storing liquid raw materials and chemicals
intended for the oil and chemical industry, were hit in Pancevo, Novi Sad,
Sombor and elsewhere, causing large contamination of soil and the air:
1. Fuel storage in Lipovica, which caused a great fire in the Lipovica
forest (on 26 March 1999);
2. “Beopetrol” storage in Belgrade (on 4 April 1999);
3. “Beopetrol” storage in Bogutovac (4-24 April 1999);
4. Fuel storage of the boiler plant in Novi Beograd (on 4 April 1999);
5. Chemical plant “Prva Iskra” in Baric - destruction of the production
line (19 April 1999);
6. Oil Refinery in Pancevo - totally demolished (4-16 April 1999);
7. Petrochemical industry “DP HIP PETROHEMIJA” in Pancevo - totally
demolished (14-15 April 1999);
8. Fertilizer plant “DP HIP AZOTARA” in Pancevo - totally destroyed (14-15
April 1999);
9. “Jugopetrol” installations in Smederevo (on 4-13 April 1999);
10. Thermo electric power station/boiler plant in Novi Sad (on 5 April
1999);
11. Oil Refinery in Novi Sad, storage of bitumen (5 and 6 April 1999);
12. “Jugopetrol” storage in Sombor (on 7 April 1999);
13. Fuel storage “Naftagas promet” which is located 10 km from Sombor (5
April 1999);
14. Naftagas warehouse between Conoplje and Kljaicevo (Sombor);
15. “Beopetrol” fuel storage in Pristina (on 7 April 1999);
16 Jugopetrol warehouse in Pristina (on 12 April 1999);
17. Jugopetrol petrol station in Pristina ( on 13 April 1999);
18. Fuel depot in Gruua, near Kragujevac;
3. AGRICULTURE:
1. PIK “Kopaonik” in Kursumlija;
2. PIK “Mladost” in Gnjilane;
3. Agricultural Complex “Malizgan” in Dolac;
4. Agricultural Complex “Djuro Strugar” in Kula;
5. Agricultural and food-processing plant and a cow-breeding farm with 220
milk cows “Pester”, in Sjenica, has been destroyed;
6. In forest fires caused by NATO cruise missiles and bombs over 250
hectares of forests have been burned down;
7. Several thousand hectares of fertile land, many rivers, lakes and
underground waters have been polluted due to the spillage of petrochemical
substances, oil spills and slicks;
4. HOSPITALS AND HEALTH CARE CENTRES (21):
NATO aviation also targeted many hospitals and health-care institutions,
which have been partially damaged or totally destroyed, including:
- Neuropsychiatric Ward “Dr. Laza Lazarevic” and Central Pharmacy of the
Emergency Centre in Belgrade;
- “Sveti Sava” hospital in Belgrade;
- Army Medical Academy in Belgrade;
- Gynaecological Hospital and Maternity Ward of the Clinical Centre in
Belgrade;
- Health Care Centre in Rakovica;
- Hospital and Medical Centre in the territory in Leskovac;
- Gerontological Centre in Leskovac;
- Hospital and Poly-clinic in Nis;
- General Hospital in Djakovica;
- City Hospital in Novi Sad;
- Medical Centre and Ambulance Centre in Aleksinac;
- Medical Centre in Kraljevo;
- Dispensary on Mount Zlatibor;
- City hospital in Valjevo;
- Dispensary “Krusik” in Valjevo;
- Hospital for treatment of dystrophia in Novi Pazar;
- Health Care Centre in Kursumlija;

5. SCHOOLS (MORE THAN 200 FACILITIES)
Over 2000 schools, faculties and facilities for students and children were
damaged or destroyed (over 25 faculties, 10 collages, 45 secondary and 90
elementary schools, 8 student dormitories, as well as a number of
kindergartens), including:
- Elementary schools “16. oktobar” and “Vladimir Rolovic” in Belgrade;
- Day-care centre in settlement Petlovo Brdo in Belgrade;
- Elementary school and Engineering secondary school centre in Rakovica;
- Two secondary schools in the territory of Nis;
- Faculty for construction and architecture in Nis;
- Faculty for machine-technical studies in Nis;
- Faculty for electro-technical studies in Nis;
- Faculties of Law and Economics and elementary school “Radoje Domanovic”
in Nis;
- Elementary schools “Toza Markovic”, “Djordje Natosevic”, “Veljko
Vlahovic”, “Sangaj” and “Djuro Danicic” and a day-care centre “Duga” in
Novi Sad and creches in Visarionova Street and in the neighbourhood of
Sangaj; Traffic School Centre, Faculty of Philosophy;
- Four elementary schools and a Medical high school in the territory of
Leskovac;
- Elementary school in Lucane, as well as a larger number of education
facilities in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija;
- Elementary schools in Kraljevo and the villages of Cvetka, Aketa and
Ladjevci;
- In Sombor: elementary schools “Ivo Lola Ribar”, “A. Mrazovic”, “N.
Vukicevic” and
“Nikola Tesla”
- School centre in Kula;
- Agricultural school in Valjevo;
6. PUBLIC AND HOUSING FACILITIES (TENS OF THOUSANDS)
- The residence of the President of the FR of Yugoslvia in Belgrade,
sustained heavy damages (22 April 1999);
- Severe damage to the facilities of the Republican and Federal Ministry
of the Interior in Belgrade (3 April 1999),
- Damage to the building of the Institute for Security of the Ministry of
the Interior in Banjica (3 April 1999);
- Severe damage to the TV RTS studio in Pristina;
- Heavy damage to Hydro-Meteorological Station (Bukulja, near
Arandjelovac);
- Post Office in Pristina destroyed (7 April 1999);
- Refugee centre in Pristina destroyed (7 April 1999);
- “Tornik” ski resort on Mount Zlatibor (on 8 April 1999);
- “Divcibare” mountain resort (on 11 April 1999);
- “Baciste” Hotel on Mount Kopaonik (on 12 April 1999);
- City power plant in the town of Krusevac (12-13 April 1999);
- Meteorological Station on Mount Kopaonik damaged (on 13 April 1999);
- Four libraries in Rakovica sustained heavy damage: “Radoje Dakic”,
“Isidora Sekulic”, “Milos Crnjanski” and “Dusan Matic”;
- Refugee camp “7 juli” in Paracin has sustained heavy damage;
- Office building of the Provincial Executive Council of Vojvodina, Novi
Sad (18.04.1999.);
- Hotel “Mineral” in Bogutovacka Banja sustained heavy damages (19 Aptil
1999);
- Office building of the power distribution board “Elektrodistribucija” in
Kursumlija (20 April 1999);
- Hotel “Putnik” on Mt. Kopaonik;
- Bussiness centre “Usce” in Belgrade (21 April 1999);
- Refugee camp “Majino naselje” in Djakovica (21 April 1999);
- Radio Television of Serbia office building in Belgrade (23 April 1999);
- Youth and children centre in Belgrade (23 April 1999);
- Youth theater “Dusko Radovic” in Belgrade (23 April 1999);
- Post Office in Nis (23 April 1999);
- Several thousand housing facilities damaged or destroyed, privately or
State owned, across Yugoslavia - most striking examples being housing
blocks in downtown Aleksinac and those near Post Office in Pristina.
7. INFRASTRUCTURE:
- Damage to a power supply transmitted in Batajnica (26 March 1999);
- Damage to water supply system in Zemun (5 April 1999);
- Damage to a power supply transmitter in Bogutovac (10 April 1999);
- Telephone lines cut off in Bogutovac (10 April 1999);
- Damage to a power station in Pristina (12 April 1999);
- Damage to Bistrica hydroelectric power station in Polinje (13 April 1999);
- Damage to electric power transmission lines and distribution network in
the zone under air stikes by NATO enemy aircraft;
- Destruction of power supply transmitters in Belgrade suburbs of Resnik
and Zemun Polje (23 April 1999);
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
TV TRANSMITTERS (23):
1. Jastrebac (Prokuplje)
2. Gucevo (Loznica)
3. Cot (Fruska Gora)
4. Grmija (Pristina)
5. Bogutovac (Pristina)
6. TV transmitter on Mt Goles (Pristina)
7. Mokra Gora (Pristina)
8. Kutlovac (Stari Trg)
9. “Cigota” (Uzice)
10. “Tornik” (Uzice)
11. Transmitter on Crni Vrh (Jagodina)
12. Satellite station “Yugoslavia” (in Prilike near Ivanjica)
13. TV masts and transmitters (Novi Sad)
14. TV transmitter on Mt Ovcara (Cacak)
15. TV transmitter in Kijevo (Belgrade)
16. TV transmitter on Mt Cer
17. Relay on Mt Jagodnji (Krupanj)
18. TV transmitter “Iriski Venac” (Fruska Gora)
19. TV relay on Mt. Bukulja;
20. Transmitter in Gazimestan (Pristina);
21. RTV transmitter in Krnjaca (Belgrade);
22. RTV transmitter on Mt. Gobelj (Mt. Kopaonik);
23. RTV transmitter on top of the business centre “Usce” used by RTV
Kosava, RTV Pink, SOS channel, TV BK and Radio S (Belgrade);
CULTURAL-HISTORICAL MONUMENTS
AND RELIGIOUS SHRINES
MEDIEVAL MONASTERIES AND RELIGIOUS SHRINES (18):
1. Monastery Gracanica from 14th century (24 March - 6 April 1999);
2. Monastery Rakovica from 17th century (29 March 1999);
3. Patriarchate of Pec (1 April 1999);
4. Church in Jelasnica near Surdulica (4 April 1999);
5. Monastery of the Church of St. Juraj (built in 1714) in Petrovaradin (1
April 1999);
6. Monastery of Holy Mother (12th century) at the estuary of the Kosanica
in the Toplica - territory of municipality of Kursumlija (4 April 1999);
7. Monastery of St. Nicholas (12th century) in the territory of the
municipality of Kursumlija (4 April 1999);
8. Monastery of St. Archangel Gabriel in Zemun (5 April 1999);
9. Roman Catholic Church St. Antonio in Djakovica (29 March 1999);
10. Orthodox cemetery in Gnjilane (30 March 1999);
11. Monuments destroyed in Bogutovac (8 April 1999);
12. “Kadinjaca” memorial complex (8 April 1999);
13. Vojlovica monastery near Pancevo (12 April 1999);
14. Hopovo monastery, iconostasis damaged (12 April 1999);
15. Orthodox Christian cemetery in Pristina (12 April 1999);
16. Monastery church St, Archangel Michael in Rakovica (16 April 1999);
17. Orthodox church St. Marco in Belgrade (24 April 1999);
18. Russian Orthodox church Holly Trinity in Belgrade (24 April 1999);
CULTURAL-HISTORICAL MONUMENTS AND MUSEUMS (9):
1. Severe damage to the roof structure of the Fortress of Petrovaradin (1
April 1999);
2. Heavy damage to “Tabacki bridge”, four centuries old, in Djakovica (5
April 1999);
3. Substantial damage to the building in Stara Carsija (Old street) in
Djakovica (5 April 1999);
4. Destroyed archives housed in one of the Government buildings in
Belgrade (3 April 1999);
5. Memorial complex in Gucevo (Loznica);
6. Memorial complex “Sumarice” in Kragujevac;
7. Vojvodina Museum in Novi Sad;
8. Old Military Barracks in Kragujevac - under the protection of the state
(16 April 1999);
9. Memorial complex Crveni Krst in Nis (21 April 1999);
http://www.theonion.com/content/news_briefs/study_38_percent_of_people
Study: 38 Percent Of People Not Actually Entitled To Their Opinion
May 23, 2007 | Issue 43•21

CHICAGO—In a surprising refutation of the conventional wisdom on opinion entitlement, a study conducted by the University of Chicago’s School for Behavioral Science concluded that more than one-third of the U.S. population is neither entitled nor qualified to have opinions.
“On topics from evolution to the environment to gay marriage to immigration reform, we found that many of the opinions expressed were so off-base and ill-informed that they actually hurt society by being voiced,” said chief researcher Professor Mark Fultz, who based the findings on hundreds of telephone, office, and dinner-party conversations compiled over a three-year period. “While people have long asserted that it takes all kinds, our research shows that American society currently has a drastic oversupply of the kinds who don’t have any good or worthwhile thoughts whatsoever. We could actually do just fine without them.”
In 2002, Fultz’s team shook the academic world by conclusively proving the existence of both bad ideas during brainstorming and dumb questions during question-and-answer sessions.
http://www.espritdecorps.ca/man_on_a_mission.htm
Man on a Mission

By Scott Taylor
June 30, 2005

CHRISTOPHER JAMES finds out why a Canadian army veteran is now a leading campaigner for the truth about Kosovo

SCOTT Taylor is a man on a mission. The Canadian army veteran, turned writer
and peace campaigner, is fighting to expose how Kosovo’s fabled “mass graves” containing victims of “Serbian genocide” are a manufactured myth as phoney as Iraq’s supposed weapons of mass destruction.

As an eyewitness to the 1999 Kosovo war, Taylor’s message is an uncompromising rebuttal of everyday Western misrepresentations of the conflict - a conflict which culminated in the annexation by NATO of Serbia’s southern province six year’s ago this month.

“Was Kosovo a messy, inter-ethnic civil war? Absolutely. Was it a planned, organised genocide? No,” Taylor tells speaking tour audiences with a calm, quiet authority acquired from time in the frontline as soldier and war correspondent.

Taylor is editor and founder of Esprit de Corps - an independent journal for rank-and-file Canadian military, acclaimed for its exposure of corruption within army top brass, its campaigning on issues such as Gulf War syndrome and its countering of official spin surrounding the “war on terror.”

By his own admission Taylor launched the magazine in 1988 as a cheerleading pro-army publication, funded by defence contractors who he today derides as “the evil military-industrial complex.”

His experiences reporting from the 1991 Gulf War, witnessing unspeakable carnage inflicted on defenceless Iraqi conscripts, was the turning point for both Taylor and for Esprit de Corps, which has since transformed, he says, into “the conscience of the Canadian Defence Department.”

Reporting from war-torn Bosnia in 1992, Taylor’s experiences alongside Canadian troops again contrasted with mainstream media spin, which he saw as obsessed with demonising the Serbian population of the disintegrating Yugoslav federation.

He returned to the Balkans in 1999 as one of the few Western journalists to report from within Kosovo during the 78-day aerial bombardment of Yugoslavia by NATO - which was then acting as a de facto airforce for the ethnic Albanian supremacists and separatists of the Kosovo Liberation Army.

This provided “an incredible vantage point to see what was taking place,” says Taylor, whose eyewitness experience contrasted sharply with that of thousands of NATO-accredited journalists reporting from refugee camps in Macedonia and elsewhere, “getting second and third-hand stories, many of
which later turned out to be fabricated.”

It is worthwhile recalling the extreme wartime hysteria that gripped Britain and the West at the time. So complete was the demonisation of Serbia and its political leadership that few, even on the anti-war left, opposed the barbarism deployed by NATO on the Yugoslav people and the violation of their national sovereignty.

Daily press conferences saw NATO spindoctors announce spiralling death tolls that rapidly reached upwards of 100,000 murdered Albanians, guaranteeing worldwide banner headlines that screamed of genocide and holocaust revisited on Europe. Countless other horror stories included the claim that a further
40,000 Albanians were detained in Pristina’s sports stadium awaiting a grisly fate. All this proved to be false.

One Spanish forensic team sent into Kosovo after the conflict was told to expect to conduct 2,000 autopsies. After just 187 bodies were produced, it returned home early.

“All the bodies were buried in individual graves, oriented for the most part toward Mecca out of respect for the religious beliefs of the Albanian Kosovars and without sign of torture,” reported the Spanish daily El Pais, one of the few, if not the only, papers to carry the story.

The parallels between Iraq’s “weapons of mass destruction” and Kosovo’s “mass graves” are obvious, says Taylor. Both were dreamed up by politicians to sell otherwise unpopular wars to their people, although the former claim was clearly met with greater scepticism.

“These are all becoming information wars now,” says Taylor. “It has become such a game for them. Spin machines manipulate the media and the media in turn manipulates the population.”

When Yugoslav troops withdrew from Kosovo, to be replaced by NATO occupiers, Taylor watched the inevitable media circus “roll in” with editorial orders to find mass graves and “the shattered remnants of the Serbian army,” he says.

“But they couldn’t find the mass graves because they didn’t exist. There were bodies of course - there had been a civil war.”
Despite the unprecedented pounding that Kosovo, and Serbia as a whole, took from NATO, the Yugoslav army escaped almost completely unscathed.

“Some $13 billion of weaponry had been dropped on Kosovo to destroy 13 tanks, two or three of which were museum pieces used as decoys,” says Taylor.

The brunt of the assault was inflicted on the country’s civilian population - hospitals, factories, bridges, the electricity grid, water supplies, Serb TV and other targets were reduced to rubble while the republic’s environment suffered deadly contamination through the use of depleted uranium weapons.

According to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the new world order’s phoney court where former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic continues to face down genocide and war crimes charges, the total body count from Kosovo stands at 2,788.

Contrast this with wartime claims of 100,000 murdered Albanian civilians and Taylor’s message comes sharply into focus, particularly when one considers that the ICTY death toll includes combatants from both sides as well as victims of NATO bombing.

Following the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces Albanian separatists immediately set about clearing the province of its minority populations. Some 200,000 Serbs, Jews, Roma, Turks and ethnic Albanians loyal to Yugoslavia have fled Kosovo since 1999, all under the nose of 18,000 NATO “peacekeepers” (actually occupiers), many based at Camp Bondsteel, a gargantuan US base sprawling over 750 acres in the south-east of the province.

Presented as simple “revenge attacks,” these were in fact the start of a final push to ethnically cleanse the province of non-Albanians - a process which began with anti-Serb pogroms following the 1980 death of Yugoslav president Josip Broz Tito, whose towering leadership had hitherto helped hold the federation together since the end of World War II.

As far back as 1982, long before the development of a “Washington line” on Kosovo for obedient journalists to follow, the New York Times reported that: “[Kosovo] Albanian nationalists have a two-point platform.first to establish what they call an ethnically clean Albanian republic and then the merger with Albania to form a greater Albania.”

In 1987 the same paper quoted a Kosovo Albanian nationalist leader’s demand for an “ethnic Albania that includes western Macedonia, southern Montenegro, part of southern Serbia, Kosovo and Albania itself.”

Last year’s “Kosovo Kristallnacht”, as it was dubbed by one UN official, where Albanian supremacists rampaged through the province leaving dozens dead, hundreds wounded and 35 ancient Christian Orthodox churches, some dating from the 13th Century, razed to the ground, was merely the latest violent manifestation of this racist doctrine.

* Christopher James wishes to thank Filmmakers Against War for their assistance in producing this article. Scott Taylor is the subject of a Filmmakers Against War production due for release this year.
http://www.lewrockwell.com/orig/keller16.html
Yugoslavia and Afghanistan – How to Understand Media Spin
by John Keller
Propaganda has accompanied the majority of wars, as a precursor, during the war, and then as official history after the dust has settled and the conquerors (aka peacekeepers) move in. From Cato and Carthage down to Kuwaiti incubator babies, truth is indeed the first casualty. Arguably, the first defeat for the US military in the propaganda war was Vietnam. Being in the business of winning wars, the U.S. military concocted new ways to control the media, and has adapted new strategies for an increasingly connected world. The first test, and so far greatest victory for the New World Order spin-masters, was the Persian Gulf War. We saw the daily press briefing evolve into its current form as a carefully crafted propaganda session designed to give the media the good news about how well the war is going, and how the evil-doers are being punished. We saw the media assigned to specific press liaison officers, and trucked around from location to location under constant supervision. The press, as usual, ate it up.
The military employs multiple strategies (and a PR firm or two) to shape public perception of the news by controlling the information released to the media. Jared Israel wrote an excellent article describing how these techniques are used in print (and sometimes on TV). Words are chosen carefully based on the emotional response they elicit. Certain facts are referred to again and again, while others are completely ignored. Other “facts” are manufactured out of whole cloth, usually with the tag “unsubstantiated” attached to allow weasel room later. All events are scripted into a master storyline designed to paint the conflict as one of good against evil. The side of righteous America is pitted against the twisted Taliban, or Milosevic, or Iraq, or Noriega, etc.
Luckily (ha ha!), we have a very recent military engagement to compare to our current situation. The “humanitarian intervention” in Kosovo gives us something to compare the selective use of images, interviews, and facts to understand how the military and the media shape opinion. Let me restate: the government and military use the media to shape your opinion, and they are very good at it. The current bombing of Afghanistan and the 1999 bombing of Kosovo have a common element that exposes the hypocrisy and selective reporting endemic to any war effort. In both situations, military activity caused a massive refugee crisis, but the way the refugees are portrayed is vastly different between the two wars.
Set aside whether the refugees were the result of ethnic cleansing or people fleeing a bombing zone. In Kosovo, close to two million refugees fled the province after the Nato bombing campaign started. The media broadcast the suffering of hundreds of thousands of refugees in the camps setup in neighboring Macedonia, Albania, and Montenegro. Countless interviews, non-stop coverage of refugee columns, and an appeal to send food and money to help the innocents driven out by war were the common themes across all networks. Endless coverage of the refugees on TV made the war for “humanitarian intervention” seem like a noble goal. Americans were told that Slobodan Milosevic was carrying out his “final solution” on Kosovo Albanians. Never mind that the refugees started leaving Kosovo AFTER the bombs started falling.
During the bombing, the talking heads in the media chattered about how the evil Serbs had caused such misery. It was assumed that there was a deliberate program of ethnic cleansing. This was easy to do with CIA trained KLA fighters providing all the translation services, which invariably sounded like “They rounded us up and told us to leave. They took our papers.” These reports were taken at face value. So, blame for the refugee crisis was placed squarely on the Serbs. There’s plenty of evidence that the refugee crisis in Kosovo was the result of bombing, and scant little that it was an organized program. The Germans admitted as much when a top general came clean about how his spies faked “Operation Horseshoe”. That and the fact that the body count on all sides has amounted to 3,200 instead of the 100,000 that James Rubin claimed. That’s after the bombing, and includes military and civilian casualties on both sides. That’s a forensics debate for another day, however. For this article, we can even assume (for the sake of all the Serb haters out there) that there was a program of ethnic cleansing.
Compare the non-stop coverage of the Kosovo refugee crisis to the coverage of Afghan refugees. It’s estimated that over 80,000 refugees have made it into Pakistan since the bombing started. The Red Cross states that over 2 million refugees are inside Afghanistan, mostly headed for friendly Pakistan, but many have been turned away. Two million Afghan refugees already live in Pakistani refugee camps. Where are the camera crews in Pakistani refugee camps? I had to dig to turn up this Reuters photo. You won’t find the same kind of non-stop film coverage of an even larger refugee crisis in Pakistan than the Kosovo refugees. Where is the non-stop CNNBCBSMSNBCABC coverage, complete with clucking tongue commentary on the cruelty of war? When the families of the dead are interviewed, or give accounts of being bombed in their sleep, the Pentagon instructed media flacks are quick to chime in with “those numbers of civilian casualties can’t be independently verified,” a phrase seldom heard in the Kosovo conflict.
Let’s compare the government’s handling of refugees in the Kosovo war with the current bombing of Afghanistan. When the refugees started leaving Kosovo, the U.S. government asked Macedonia, Montenegro, and (obviously) Albania to allow them across the border. In this war, the U.S. has aided a willing Pakistani regime in keeping the borders closed, and the refugees out. If too many refugees enter Pakistan, the U.S. will be unable to convince the world, and more importantly, the Pakistani government will be unable to convince their people, that this is a war of “targeted strikes against terrorists, and not a humanitarian catastrophe in the making. The war planners knew this and started dropping food packages early on. The Red Cross, Doctors Without Borders, and the UNHCR agree that the food is more for public relations than relieving hunger. We are scattering water drops on a raging inferno of starvation, while blocking the fire trucks.
So, my question for the mass media is this. Where are the CNN camera crews, pressed in around the refugees? Where is Christiane Amanpore with her righteous indignation? Images are powerful things. Americans see people suffering on TV, and they don’t like it. The military knows this. When it suited their purpose in Kosovo, they made sure to pack the airwaves with images of the displaced and hungry. “See. We’re fighting to help save these people from oppression.” When the story is obviously one of suffering CAUSED by our military, the story gets reported in print, if at all, and camera coverage is downplayed or outright spiked. No spin in the world can hide that fact that our military has caused a massive refugee crisis in Afghanistan. Will George W. Bush sit in the Hague kangaroo court with Slobodan Milosevic to answer charges of genocide and ethnic cleansing? Not very damn likely.
As I finish proofreading this article, CNN manages to illustrate my point perfectly by calling for more “balance” in reporting. Stop and think for a moment if you heard a call to limit the amount of coverage given to civilian casualties in the Kosovo war? Not for a second, because the Nato spin masters could pin it on the Hitler de Jour, Mr. Milosevic.
This war isn’t going all that well. Americans are watching it while sitting in comfortable living rooms a few feet from the refrigerator. If they see enough images of Afghan refugees fleeing U.S. cluster bombs or digging for dead relatives in the remains of a hospital hit by a “Bunker Buster” bomb, they might realize that this war is not just. Don’t be fooled by the media spin. Read for fact, verify facts, avoid the biased words, and draw your own conclusions.
November 2, 2001
http://www.infowar-monitor.net/print.php?sid=356
In both Kosovo and Iraq, the government�s war strategy seems to have been threefold:

1. In order to whip up public support for war, tell lies so outrageous that most people will believe that no one would have dared to make them up.

2. When the conflict is over, dismiss questions about the continued lack of evidence as �irrelevant� and stress alternative �benefits� from the military action, e.g., �liberation� of the people.

3. Much later on, when the truth is finally revealed, rely on the fact that most people have lost interest and are now concentrating on the threat posed by the next new Hitler.

An admission of the government�s culpability for the Kosovan war only slipped out in July 2000, when Lord Gilbert, the ex-defence minister, told the House of Commons that the Rambouillet terms offered to the Yugoslav delegation had been �absolutely intolerable� and expressly designed to rovoke war. Gilbert�s bombshell warranted scarcely line in the mainstream British media, which ad been so keen to label the Yugoslavs the uilty party a year before.

http://neilclark66.blogspot.com/2006/02/genocide-that-wasnt.html
Friday, February 17, 2006
The Genocide That Wasn’t
http://www.mediamonitors.net/gowans18.html
Even when they condemn victors’ justice, the media supports it

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3724/is_199911/ai_n8853519

I was right about Kosovo
Spectator, The, Nov 20, 1999 by Laughland, John
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/kosovo/undword-09.htm
In August 1999, KFOR forces arrested the former mayor of Orahovac, Andjelko Kolasinac, along with more than a dozen other Orahovac Serbs. On June 14, 2001, the Prizren district court found Kolasinac and another Orahovac Serb, Cedomir Jovanovic, guilty of war crimes against the civilian population of Orahovac, and sentenced them to five and twenty years imprisonment respectively. According to the Humanitarian Law Center, which monitored the trial, the defendants were denied a fair trial.

http://www.iraqwar.org/NATOwashlies.htm
http://www.antiwar.com/orig/pilger.php?articleid=8744
http://worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=17147
http://g2mil.com/Jun2004.htm
http://www.apc.org.nz/pma/sshea.htm
http://iraqwar.org/germanreport.htm
http://www.balkanpeace.org/monitor/yeco/yeco02.shtml
http://www.xs4all.nl/~stgvisie/VISIE/fisk-du.html
http://www.antiwar.com/justin/pf/p-j082300.html
http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=12924
http://emperors-clothes.com/articles/chuss/nato.htm
http://www.usatoday.com/news/index/kosovo/koso1006.htm
http://www.ndirect.co.uk/~richardj/Docs/usa_today.htm
http://www.geocities.com/anaxfiles/kosovo/
http://www.freerepublic.com/forum/a3825d91917d2.htm
APPENDIX 1
1. Evidence that reporters KNEW the U.S. government had deliberately written the Rambouillet “peace” agreement to be so extreme that the Serbs couldn’t sign it. That is, it was a setup to achieve bombing. But this was never reported. See: http://www.fair.org/press-releases/kosovo-talks.html
2. Documents, not intended for publication, from the German Courts and German Foreign Ministry According to these official German documents, there was no Serbian persecution of Albanians during the year before the bombing started. http://www.counterpunch.com/germanmemo.html
3. Three reports from Paul Watson, Pulitzer Prize winning reporter on the ground in Kosovo since bombing started.
a) “Missing ” Albanian men are doing fine, and fraternizing with Yugoslav troops http://www.beograd.com/nato/texts/english/l/LATimes/lat_kosovo990517.htm
b) Despite Western reports, Mr. Watson sees NO evidence of massacres or organized government persecution of Albanians in Pristina, capital of Kosovo http://www.counterpunch.com/watson.html
c) Albanians and Serbs work side by side in Kosovo to undo damage caused by NATO’s bombs http://www.latimes.com/HOME/NEWS/REPORTS/YUGO/DISPATCH/t000048733.html
4. Here’s a brilliant deconstruction of a NATO mass grave hoax http://www.srpska-mreza.com/Mass_Graves_Hoax/
5. Eve-Ann Prentice, London Times reporter targeted (!) by NATO planes over Kosovo, describes Serbian/Albania kindness towards her after the attack. Gives a whole different impression of what these folks are like from what we’re getting on TV. (http://www.the-times.co.uk/news/pages/tim/99/06/01/timkoskos02002.html?1124027)
6. What is the KLA, the Kosovo Albanian group for which NATO is now providing an air force? Prof. Chossudovsky’s answers and it isn’t good. http://www.transnational.org/features/crimefinansed.html
7. Report of U.S. Congressional Mission to Serbia refutes NATO assertions about atrocities and ethnic cleansing. (http://www.srpska-mreza.com/library/facts/findings1.html)
8. A group of articles from the NY Times and other papers in the 1980s show the Serbs were victims of a racist movement in Kosovo. http://members.tripod.com/~sarant_2/ksm.html
9. When NATO planes bomb Albania, everyone within miles flees - illustrating the Serbian government’s point that bombing is what crated the refugee crisis. (http://www.the-times.co.uk/news/pages/tim/99/06/02/timkoskos01002.html?1124027)
10. Albanians take up arms against the secessionist KLA. http://www.latimes.com/HOME/NEWS/REPORTS/YUGO/DISPATCH/t000048921.html
11. Sean Gervasi has written some of the best analysis of U.S. and German plans for carving up the world. For instance, see: http://www.srpska-mreza.com/library/facts/Gervasi.html
12. NATO has been demonizing the Serbs for 9 years. Here one of the most successful slanders, the concentration camp hoax, is debunked by Thomas Deichmann. http://www.informinc.co.uk/ITN-vs-LM/story/LM97_Bosnia.html

http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/Kosovo/Reports/atrocit.html
Source: http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/kosovoii/atrocit.html
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb1367/is_200106/ai_n6385196
Body Count in Kosovo.(Brief Article)
Nation, The, June, 2001 by Hitchens, Christopher

http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,,1892888,00.html

655,000 Iraqis killed since invasion’
http://www.fortwayne.com/mld/journalgazette/17284466.htm

Report shows hostile post-invasion Iraq predicted

Bosnia, Dodik

http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=287929&selected=Analyses
Croatia: Fueling or Dampening the Rising Balkan Conflict?
April 30, 2007 22 51 GMT

Summary

The “political father” of modern-day Croatia, Ivica Racan, died April 29, leaving the country without the leader who brought it closer to the West. Racan’s death comes at a time when Croatia’s neighbors are facing internal instability, which means Croatia must decide either to break from its Western path and radicalize or to work with its new Western partners toward a more European solution to problems in the Balkans.

Analysis

Ivica Racan, the “political father” of modern-day Croatia, died April 29 of brain cancer, leaving the country without the leader who moved it closer to the West. Racan is known for democratizing Croatia by battling Serbian nationalist leader Slobodan Milosevic, organizing Croatia’s first democratic elections, cleaning up the country after the Balkan wars and creating Croatia’s relationship with the European Union.

Racan’s center-left Social Democratic Party (SDP), along with a handful of moderate and left parties, created a coalition that has counterbalanced the ruling Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) since 2003. The HDZ gained enormous support in the 2003 elections when it shifted away from its ultra-nationalist policies and “reformed” itself into a more moderate right-wing party. HDZ has made great leaps since then in developing ties with the European Union and Western institutions, making policies that mirror those of Racan’s SDP. However, the personalities within the two parties have kept them vehemently opposed — not because of policy, but due to personal scandals and politicking.

With the death of SDP’s beloved and symbolic leader, the moderate-left coalition could dissolve in the short term. Racan hand-picked and groomed his political successor, Zoran Milanovic, to handle Croatia’s domestic and foreign political future. The problem is that Milanovic is young — he recently turned 40 — and has not had the time to consolidate a following within Croatia. It will most likely take some time, with Racan gone, for Milanovic to muster his forces. This will leave HDZ to sweep the parliamentary elections in November. This will not change the fact that Croatia is on an almost-certain path to EU and NATO membership, but it will change the balance of power in the Balkans — where tensions are escalating.

Rising Tensions

Tensions in the Balkans are rising on two major fronts: Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Serbia is still without a government after months of political wrangling — and with a deadline to form a government quickly approaching (May 14). This deadline comes as Serbia’s secessionist region of Kosovo says it will gain (or unilaterally declare) its controversial independence by the end of May. The entire international community has been watching Kosovo and Serbia in an attempt to prevent any destabilization — especially of the ethnic cleansing kind — of the Balkans in the process.

The problem is that while the world has focused on Serbia and Kosovo, it has ignored a quickly rising problem in Serbia’s neighbor, Bosnia-Herzegovina. The United Nations and European Union have been pulling resources — everything from negotiators to security forces — from Bosnia-Herzegovina to Kosovo, leaving all the different Bosnian ethnicities to fight it out without much supervision. Meanwhile, Bosnian Serb leader and nationalist Milorad Dodik has been consolidating power in Bosnia — not only in the Serbian autonomous region of Republika Srpska, of which he is prime minister, but on the federal level as well — so much that he has been called an up-and-coming Milosevic replacement.

International security officials within the country have said the political situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina has gotten worse in the past year than in all the short history of the state since the 1995 Dayton Accords. The entire country is in a deadlock as its three ethnic groups — the Bosnian Muslims (called Bosniacs), Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs — fight over police, constitutional and media reform. Ethnic tensions have not been this obvious since the end of the 1992-1995 war between the Bosnian Serbs and a Croat-Bosniac quasi-alliance, which left more than 100,000 dead.

In the past year, Dodik has actively shaken things up. He battled to gain his fellow Serbs the most important offices in the federal government (the interior, economic and prime ministerial posts), called for Republika Srpska to secede and create a “Greater Serbia” with its neighbor; consolidated the Serbian front against the fractured Croat and Muslim groups and even incited a Croat secessionist movement.

Croatia’s Reaction

Since the end of the Balkan wars, the Serbs and Croats have competed as they race for NATO membership, but the competition is more serious within Bosnia, where their ethnic identities are at stake. Croatia would respond to a destabilization in Kosovo, Serbia or Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to protect not only itself, but also ethnic Croats outside of its borders. The ruling HDZ currently is the main group responsible for funding that campaign and organizing funds and other assistance crossing the border to ethnic Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Though they did not prevent or want to prevent it, Racan and his party long kept that assistance to a level they thought of as an obligation without allowing the support to reach levels that the European Union would see as destabilizing. Without Racan, if the HDZ does sweep the upcoming elections, any internal levers for restricting assistance to the Bosnian Croats is gone.

The one external lever that could restrict Croatia is its integration into the West — moreover, its deep relationship with EU heavyweight Germany. Croatia’s relationship with Germany dates back to World War II, and current Croatian Prime Minister Ivo Sanader boasts about being a close personal friend of German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Croatia depends on Germany’s political sway and economic investments for its future in the West.

If Germany wants to counterbalance the instability from both a Kosovar decision and Republika Srpska activism, it will have to harness Croatia’s instincts to radicalize, and use the country for European purposes. This will be the first time that Croatia will make such a large choice without Racan’s moderating voice. However, unless Croatia wants to be sucked back into — or even escalate — the Balkan conflicts it has worked so hard to detach itself from, it will have to take up Racan’s legacy and make good use of Germany’s backing in the struggle for a solution.

http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=289252

Bosnia-Herzegovina: Dodik’s Stand
May 25, 2007 17 51 GMT

Summary

The U.S. State Department meeting with Bosnia-Herzegovina’s fighting leaders — Milorad Dodik, prime minister of the Serbian entity Republika Srpska, and Haris Silajdzic, leader of the Bosnian Muslim community — has failed. The meeting ended with Dodik storming out after a series of threats and exchanges between him and U.S. Ambassador to Sarajevo Douglas McElhaney. McElhaney has threatened to have Dodik removed from office and Dodik has dared him to try, especially since Dodik knows the West already has its hands full with one conflict in the Balkans and is anxious about risking a second — and possibly larger — one.

Analysis

Bosnia-Herzegovina’s two rival leaders — Serbian entity Republika Srpska’s Prime Minister Milorad Dodik and Haris Silajdzic, leader of the Muslim community in Bosnia-Herzegovina — failed in their May 22-24 talks with U.S. State Department officials in Washington. The talks, designed to negotiate constitutional agreements between the two sides, ended late May 24 after Dodik stormed out of the meeting. He is returning to Republika Srpska on May 25.

Silajdzic has been in the United States since May 21, when Bosnia-Herzegovina celebrated the 15th anniversary of its U.N. membership. It was unclear at first whether Dodik would attend the meeting; on his way to the meeting, he called it “unnecessary” and a waste of his time because he knew that neither he nor Silajdzic would budge from their positions.
Bosnia-Herzegovina has been deadlocked since the Dayton Accords gave thecountry its current configuration in early 1995. The accords — designed by theUnited Nations after the Bosnian War — set up Bosnia-Herzegovina under three ethnicities: the Serbs, the Croats and the Muslims (known as Bosniacs). The three sides have operated under the sharp U.N. eye, with the international body setting up a high representative office to have the final political say. Bosnia-Herzegovina is split into two entities: Republika Srpska, which has an ethnically Serbian majority, and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is majority Muslim but with a large Croat community. The country has three governments — one for each ethnicity — and one central government with three presidents. As if this were not confusing enough, each government also has its own constitution and police force. It is this last point that has caused such fierce debate among the groups. The United Nations is requiring Bosnia-Herzegovina to ratify one common constitution and one unified police force in which each ethnicity plays an active part.

Dodik recently launched a large campaign for reforms countering the West’s proposals. Dodik says Muslim extremist movements have been growing exponentially in Bosnia-Herzegovina and that Republic Srpska cannot agree to a unified police force that would leave the Serbs undefended. Dodik even pushed through the central government’s parliament a law that will begin investigations into Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina who were naturalized after the Bosnian War. The law has already stripped 488 Muslims of their citizenship, and another 1,500 could be deported. The Muslim community has expressed its outrage over the new law and over Dodik. Dodik also is preparing a formal proposal for “federalized units” within Bosnia-Herzegovina that would not be allowed to be mixed ethnically. The Bosniacs have called this ethnic segregation with the potential for ethnic cleansing as seen in the past, but the Croats — who are just as nationalist as the Serbs — also are behind the plan.

In response to Dodik’s bold moves, many within Bosnia-Herzegovina have called for the U.N. high representative to step in, but that office is in transition; former U.N. High Representative Christian Schwartz-Schilling will pass the reigns to Miroslav Lajcak of Slovakia in June. Lajcak has already threatened to remove Dodik from his premiership; Dodik said Republika Srpska would not accept the high representative “using its authority to impose solutions or dismiss people” and would not concede “even if the high representative sends a battering ram before its headquarters.”

This same threat prompted Dodik to storm out of the meetings in Washington. Dodik’s exit is said to have come after a heated exchange with U.S. Ambassador to Sarajevo Douglas McElhaney. Dodik replied to McElhaney’s threat of removal by saying the United States cannot remove him because the people of Republika Srpska would not stand for it and, moreover, because Dodik had “higher friends” in Washington than McElhaney who would not allow Bosnia-Herzegovina to destabilize when there are already other problems in the region.

Dodik is not very likely to have “higher friends” in Washington, but it is true that a destabilized Bosnia-Herzegovina would be a disaster for the West, which is already preoccupied with the growing threats in Serbia and its secessionist region of Kosovo. It would be catastrophic for the West to have to take on two conflicts in the Balkans at once. Dodik has dared the West to move against him. Not only does the West have the legal authority to remove him from his post, it also is anxious to get rid of such an unpredictable leader and will use any excuse to do so after the headaches Dodik has caused. However, Dodik is returning to Republic Srpska, where he will begin rallying his support, which could set off a big — and possibly bloody — battle if he is pushed from office.